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Abstract 
Evaluation of counterfactual queries (e.g., "If 
A were true, would C have been true?") is 
important to fault diagnosis, planning, de­
termination of liability, and policy analysis. 
We present a method for evaluating counter­
factuals when the underlying causal model is 
represented by structural models a nonlin­
ear generalization of the simultaneous equa­
tions models commonly used in econometrics 
and social sciences. This new method pro­
vides a coherent means for evaluating poli­
cies involving the control of variables which, 
prior to enacting the policy were influenced 
by other variables in the system. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
A counterfactual sentence has the form 
If A were true, then C would have been true 
where A the counterfactual antecedent, specifies an ' . event that is contrary to one's real-world observatiOns, 
and C, the counterfactual consequent, specifies a result 
that is expected to hold in the alternative world where 
the antecedent is true. A typical example is "If Oswald 
were not to have shot Kennedy, then Kennedy would 
still be alive," which presumes the factual knowledge 
that Oswald did shoot Kennedy, contrary to the an­
tecedent of the sentence. 
Counterfactual reasoning is at the heart of every plan­
ning activity, especially real-time planning. �hen a 
planner discovers that the current state of affaus de­
viates from the one expected, a "plan repair" activ­
ity need be invoked to determine what went wrong 
and how it could be rectified. This activity amounts 
to an exercise of counterfactual thinking,. as it calls 
for rolling back the natural course of events and de­
termining, based on the factual observations at hand, 
whether the culprit lies in previous decisions or in some 
unexpected, external eventualities. Moreover, in rea­
soning forward to determine if things would have been 
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different a new model of the world must be consulted, 
one that embodies hypothetical changes in decisions 
or eventualities, hence, a breakdown of the old model 
or theory. 
The logic-based planning tools used in AI, such as 
STRIPS and its variants or those based on the situa­
tion calculus, do not readily lend themselves to coun­
terfactual analysis; as they are not geared for coherent 
integration of abduction with prediction, and they do 
not readily handle theory changes. Remarkably, the 
formal system developed in economics and social sci­
ences under the rubric "structural equations models" 
does offer such capabilities but, as will be discussed 
below, these capabilities are not well recognized by 
current practitioners of structural models.1 The pur­
pose of this paper is both to illustrate to AI researchers 
the basic formal features needed for counterfactual and 
policy analysis, and to call the attention of economists 
and social scientists to capabilities that are dormant 
within structural equations models. 
Counterfactual thinking dominates reasoning in polit­
ical science and economics. We say, for example, "If 
Germany were not punished so severely at the end of 
World War I, Hitler would not have come to power," 
or "If Reagan did not lower taxes, our deficit would be 
lower today." Such thought experiments emphasize an 
understanding of generic laws in the domain and are 
aimed toward shaping future policy making, for ex­
ample, "defeated countries should not be humiliated," 
or "lowering taxes (contrary to Reaganomics) tends to 
increase national debt." 
Strangely, there is very little formal work on coun­
terfactual reasoning or policy analysis in the behav­
ioral science literature. An examination of a number 
of econometric journals and textbooks, for example, 
reveals an imbalance: while an enormous mathemat-
1These were dearly recognized though by the found­
ing fathers of structural models, as can be seen in the 
publications of the Cowels Commission [Haavelmo, 1943] 
[Marschak, 1950] [Simon, 1953] but, with the exception 
of[Strotz and Wold, 1971], [Simon and Rescher, 1966] and 
[Fisher, 1970], have all but disappeared from the economet­
rics literature. 
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ical machinery is brought to bear on problems of es­
timation and prediction, policy analysis (which is the 
ultimate goal of economic theories) receives almost no 
formal treatment. Currently, the most popular meth­
ods driving economic policy making are based on so­
called reduced-form analysis: to find the impact of a 
policy involving decision variables X on outcome vari­
ables Y, one examines past data and estimates the 
conditional expectation E(Y IX = x), where x is the 
particular instantiation of X under the policy studied. 
The assumption underlying this method is that the 
data were generated under circumstances in which the 
decision variables X act as exogenous variables, that 
is, variables whose values are determined outside the 
system under analysis. However, while new decisions 
should indeed be considered exogenous for the pur­
pose of evaluation, past decisions are rarely enacted in 
an exogenous manner. 2 Almost every realistic policy 
(e.g., taxation) imposes control over some endogenous 
variables, that is, variables whose values are deter­
mined by other variables in the analysis. Let us take 
taxation policies as an example. Economic data are 
generated in a world in which the government is react­
ing to various indicators and various pressures; hence, 
taxation is endogenous in the data-analysis phase of 
the study. Taxation becomes exogenous when we wish 
to predict the impact of a specific decision to raise or 
lower taxes. The reduced-form method is valid only 
when past decisions are nonresponsive to other vari­
ables in the system, and this, unfortunately, elimi­
nates most of the interesting control variables (e.g., 
tax rates, interest rates, quotas) from the analysis.3 
2This distinction is often blurred in the literature. 
[Druzdzel and Simon, 1993], for example, state: "A vari­
able is considered exogenous to a system if its value is de­
termined outside the system, either because we can control 
its value externally (e.g., the amount of taxes in a macro­
economic model} or because we believe that this variable is 
controlled externally (like the weather in a system describ­
ing crop yields, market prices, etc.)" Still, our ability to 
externally control the value of a variable X does not render 
X exogenous for the purpose of legitimizing the reduced 
form analysis: for E[YIX = x] to represent the impact of 
X = x on Y, X must also be independent of all implicit 
factors (disturbance terms} affecting Y. 
While every economist knows that this disturbance­
independence is a necessary condition for consistent es­
timation of structural parameters, most economists as­
sume that disturbance-independence is a guaranteed prop­
erty of controllable policy variables. A popular textbook 
[Intriligator, 1978], for example, mentions these two prop­
erties as if they were synonymous: "The exogenous vari­
a;bles are variables the values for which are determined out­
side the model but which influence the model. From a 
formal standpoint the exogenous variables are assumed to 
be statistically independent of all stochastic disturbance 
terms of the model, while the endogenous variables are 
not statistically independent of those terms. . .. In general 
the exogenous variables are either historically given, policy 
variables, or determined by some separate mechanism." 
3This problem is unrelated to the celebrated Lucas's 
critique [Lucas, 1976] which concerns parameter changes 
This difficulty is not unique to economic or social pol­
icy making; it appears whenever one wishes to evaluate 
the merit of a plan on the basis of the past performance 
of other agents. Even when the signals triggering the 
past actions of those agents are known with certainty, 
a systematic method must be devised for selectively 
ignoring the influence of those signals from the evalu­
ation process. In fact, the very essence of evaluation is 
having the freedom to imagine and compare trajecto­
ries in various counterfactual worlds, where each world 
or trajectory is created by a hypothetical implementa­
tion of a policy that is free of the very pressures that 
compelled the implementation of such policies in the 
past. 
A connection between counterfactuals and policy mak­
ing was formulated in [Balke and Pearl, 1994b] using a 
simple device from action theory. In that formulation, 
the counterfactual antecedent is interpreted as a hypo­
thetical minimal intervention that forces the counter­
factual antecedent to hold true. If a system is modeled 
with structural equations (respectively, causal graphs), 
an intervention is simulated by severing all equations 
(causal edges) that correspond to (lead into) the an­
tecedent variables and setting their values to those 
specified in the antecedent [Strotz and Wold, 1971]. A 
calculus for working with interventions in causal the­
ories is given in [Pearl, 1994]. 
[Balke and Pearl, 1994b] provides background and 
motivation for the evaluation of counterfactual con­
ditionals and briefly illustrates how the intervention 
scheme would handle counterfactuals in models rep­
resented by linear structural equations. This paper 
amends and expands the treatment of counterfactuals 
and policy making in any structural model for which 
the form of the equations is give. It also presents an 
example of their use in the area of econometrics, where 
apparently no adequate formalism for dealing with pol­
icy analysis has been proposed. In contrast to reduced­
form analysis, our method allows evaluation of the con­
sequences of intervening on economic attributes that 
are endogenous in normal operation only to become 
exogenous for the purpose of evaluation. For example, 
after developing the general techniques in Section 3, 
we will illustrate their use in Section 4 by evaluating 
the effect on the demand for some commodity when a 
government imposes price controls on that commodity 
for the first time. 
2 REVIEW OF 
COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSIS 
In this section, the procedure for evaluating counter­
factual conditionals in the context of structural equa-
due to economic agents becoming aware of interventions. 
The failure of reduced-form analysis extends to physical 
systems as well, where there are no rational agents to speak 
of, and where system parameters remain unaltered (except 
those under direct control). 
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tion models will be reviewed. We will then demon­
strate this procedure on an example where the rela­
tionships among observed variables are deterministic, 
followed by an example that demonstrates how excep­
tions and disturbances incorporated into the model af­
fect the analysis procedure. 
Let V = { V1, V2, • . •  , Vn} represents the set of vari­
ables for which data may be observed in a system. 
U = {Ut, U2, ... , Um} will represent the disturbances, 
exceptions, and/or abnormalities influencing the ob­
servable variables V. For example, U could summa­
rize the influence of many exogenous factors, such as 
the "price of tea in China" or "the local weather." In 
general, each observable variable V; is a deterministic 
function of the form: 
(1) 
The structure of the model defined by these equations 
may be depicted by a causal graph, where each vari­
able on the left hand side of a structural equation is 
the child of those variables on the right hand side of 
the equation. A probability distribution over the dis­
turbances, P(u1, u2, ... , um), embodies the nondeter­
minism in the model. In general, this distribution is 
unconstrained; however, some classes of models, e.g., 
regression models, will assume that the disturbance 
variables uk are mutually independent. 
A counterfactual conditional will be written 
a-+cio (2) 
and read as "Given that we have observed o, if a were 
true, then c would have been true." The observations 
o consists of a set of value assignments to variables 
in v, e.g., Vj = Vj, vk = Vk. The counterfactual an­
tecedent a, consists of a conjunction of value assign­
ments to variables in V that are forced to hold true by 
external intervention. Typically, to justify being called 
"counterfactual" , a conflicts with o. Finally, the coun­
terfactual consequent, c, stands for the proposition of 
interest, usually the values attained by some variables 
in the system. 
The truth of a counterfactual conditional a -+ c I o 
may then be evaluated by the following procedure: 
• Use the observations o to update the joint belief" 
for all root nodes in the causal network. This joint 
belief summarizes the state of the system, because 
each non-root variable is a deterministic function 
of its causal influences. 
• Replace the structural equation for each variable 
vk referred to in the counterfactual antecedent 
a with the equation vk = avk where avk is the 
value of Vk specified in a. This implements the 
local intervention that forces the counterfactual 
antecedent to hold true. 
4 Here we use the generic term "belief" to refer to either 
truth assignments or probabilities. 
Captain's signal 
Bob's firing 
Traitor's health 
Figure 1: Causal structure reflecting the influence 
that the Captain's signal has on Bob's firing and the 
Traitor's health, and the direct influence that Bob's fir­
ing has on the Traitor's health. 
• Compute the solutions or belief of the consequent 
proposition c according to the modified set of 
structural equations. 
This procedure will work whenever we have the func­
tional form of the /; 's, in which case the model is called 
parametric; otherwise, the model is called nonparamet­
ric. In particular, this paper concentrates on linear 
and boolean functions (e.g., Noisy-OR gates). In the 
case that the model is nonparametric, only bounds 
may be calculated for the belief of a counterfactual 
consequent [Balke and Pearl, 1994a]. 
To illustrate the intervention-based interpretation of 
counterfactuals, consider a firing squad with several 
riflemen (one called Bob) and a Captain who gives a 
signal to either shoot or release a prisoner charged with 
treason. The behavior of these agents is as follows: 
• The Captain waits for the court decision. 
• Bob typically fires his rifle if and only if the Cap­
tain gives the signal to shoot. 
• The Traitor typically dies if and only if the Cap­
tain gives the signal to shoot or Bob fires his rifle. 
Note that if the Captain gives the signal to shoot and 
Bob does not fire, the traitor will typically die as a 
result of the other riflemen shooting, but these inter­
mediate causes will not be made explicit in this story 
in order to keep the model simple. 
The generic causal structure that reflects this descrip­
tion is represented in Figure 1. The three variables C, 
B, and T have the following domains: 
{ 
0 - Captain gives the signal to release 
} 
E the traitor. c 1 Captain gives the signal to shoot -
the traitor. 
b E 
{ 
0 Bob does not fire his rifle. } 
1 - Bob fires his rifle. 
t E 
{ 
0 - Traitor lives. } 
1 = Traitor dies. 
The following subsections will demonstrate the evalu-
ation of counterfactual conditionals under two varia-
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Captain's signal 
Traitor's health 
Figure 2: Causal structure reflecting an external inter­
vention that forces the state of Bob's firing despite its 
normal causal influences, e.g., the Captain's signal. 
tions of this model. The first assumes that the behav­
iors of the characters in the story are deterministic, 
while the second admits the occurrence of exceptions. 
2.1 DETERMINISTIC ANALYSIS 
A deterministic model is a special case of the general 
structural equation model where the disturbance vari­
ables set the values of the root nodes in the causal 
graph, i.e., 
(3) 
and the remaining observable variables (those that are 
not root nodes) are deterministic functions of the set 
of observable variables V, i.e., 
(4) 
In a deterministic model, the firing-squad story may be 
concisely expressed by the following structural equa­
tions 
B 
T 
c 
BVC 
(5) 
(6) 
Suppose that we observe Bob fire his rifle (b = 1) and 
the traitor expires (t = 1). If Bob were not to have 
fired (b = 0), would the traitor have lived (t = 0), i.e., 
does b=O -+ t=O I b=1, t=1 hold true? Following the 
procedure previously outlined, the belief in the root 
nodes of the causal structure are first evaluated; in this 
case, did the captain give the order to fire? Applying 
Eq. (5) allows us to abductively infer that the Captain 
must have given the order to fire (c = 1). 
The structural equations (and hence the causal struc­
ture) are then modified to reflect an external interven­
tion forcing Bob to have not fired (b = 0): 
B 
T 
0 
BVC 
(7) 
(8) 
Figure 2 depicts the causal structure reflecting this 
modified set of structural equations. 
Finally, substituting our previously computed beliefs 
for the root nodes in the causal structure, i.e., that the 
Captain gave the order to fire (c = 1), evaluate our 
belief in the traitor's state of health. In our example 
query, substitute c = 1 and b = 0 from the intervention 
into Eq. (8) to conclude that the traitor would still 
have died (t = 1). Therefore, the analysis leads to 
the statement, "given that Bob fired his rifle and the 
traitor died, if Bob had not fired his rifle, the traitor 
would still have died." 
This method for analyzing counterfactual conditionals 
was developed with the goal of preventing reasoning 
from the counterfactual antecedent variables to their 
ancestors in the causal structure, e.g., to conclude that 
the Captain would not have given the signal to shoot, 
if Bob did not fire. Such abductive reasoning is legiti­
mate in an unchanged, typical world but does not re­
flect the subjucntive mood of the counterfactual which 
invites unexpected eventualities (e.g., Bob failing to or 
deciding not to fire), similar to eventualities that are 
considered in decision making. 
This solution is essentially the same as would be com­
puted by [Simon and Rescher, 1966], who suppress ab­
ductive inference by invoking only forward inferences. 
Our method, which suppresses abduction by removing 
equations from the model, has two advantages. In the 
probabilistic analysis, our method permits the coun­
terfactual computation using ordinary evidence prop­
agation in a dual network [Balke and Pearl, 1994b). 
Moreover, our proposal is also applicable to nonrecur­
sive theories as will be shown in Section 3. 
2.2 ASSUMPTION-BASED ANALYSIS 
In the previous subsection we assumed that there were 
no exceptions to the normal behaviors of each of the 
characters in the story. A more realistic model of the 
story would be to incorporate assumptions and excep­
tions that effect how each observable variable is ef­
fected by its observable causal influences. For exam­
ple, in the firing-squad story, there may be exceptions 
to Bob's firing his rifle in accordance with the Cap­
tain's signal: his rifle may become jammed preventing 
him from firing, or he may have had an itchy trigger 
finger. In addition, the traitor may have a cardiac 
arrest and die without anyone firing, or all the rifle­
men may miss the target. In order to accommodate 
these eventualities without explicating every possible 
scenario, we will write the structural equations with 
exception terms: 
B 
T = 
( C V abb1) 1\ •abb2 
( B V C) 1\ •a btl V abt2 
(9) 
(10) 
abb1 summarizes events that can cause Bob to fire even 
though the Captain did not give the order to fire, while 
abb2 summarizes those events that can prevent Bob 
from firing his rifle. Likewise, abt2 summarizes those 
events that can cause the Traitor to die even though 
Bob did not fire and the Captain did not give the or­
der to fire, while abn summarizes those events that 
can prevent the Traitor from expiring even though the 
riflemen fired. These abnormality variables correspond 
to the set of disturbance variables U described in our 
definition of structural equations models. 
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If we apply the previous query to this assumption­
based model, the same conclusion will be obtained, 
because the most believable world consistent with the 
observations contains no exceptions, which reduces 
Eqs. (9) and (10) to Eqs. (5) and (6). Therefore, we 
will work on a more complex query where abnormali­
ties make a difference in the conclusion. Suppose that 
we observe the Captain give the signal to release the 
traitor (c = 0) and the Traitor expires (t = 1). Given 
this data there is a possibility that Bob's firing was an 
accident. Now we ask: If Bob were not to have fired 
(b = 0), would the Traitor have lived (t = 0)5, i.e., 
does b = 0 -+ t = 0 I c = 0, t = 1 hold true? As before, 
we compute updated beliefs for each root variable in 
the model given the observations. Our belief in C is 
already given by the observation, so we only need to 
compute our belief in the abnormality variables, e.g., 
abbt· 
Qualitatively, those states of the world that minimize 
the number of abnormalities (exceptions) are to be as­
signed the highest belief. The fact that the Captain 
gave the release signal and the Traitor expired, tells us 
that there is at least one abnormal condition. Indeed, 
there are exactly two assignments to the root variables 
that satisfy the observations and only contain one ab­
normal condition: 
(C = 0, abbt = 1, abb2 = 0, abtl = 0, abt2 = 0) (11) 
(C = O, abbt = O, abb2 = O, abtl = O, abt2 = 1) (12) 
The effect of the external intervention that forces Bob 
not to fire his rifle is to be computed under these two 
states of the system. First the structural equations are 
modified to reflect the external intervention: 
B 
T 
0 
( B V C) 1\ •a btl V abt2 
(13) 
(14) 
Substituting the values from Eq. (11) into these equa­
tions leads to the belief that the Traitor would be 
alive. Intuitively, this particular state corresponds to 
the case where Bob had an itchy trigger finger and 
hence killed the Traitor; if Bob were prevented from fir­
ing, the mechanism responsible for the Traitor's death 
is disabled and the Traitor would have lived. 
However, substituting the values from Eq. (12) into the 
revised structural equations leads to the alternative 
conclusion that the Traitor would still have died. In 
this state, the Traitor died from fright, and would have 
expired even if Bob were prevented from firing. 
If the exceptions represented by abbt are more likely 
than the exceptions represented by abt2, then we 
5This counterfactual conditional differs from most in 
that no direct observation has been made for the variable 
referred to in the counterfactual antecedent; hence, tech­
nically, the conditional may or may not be "counterfac­
tual." The interpretation of a local-intervention on the 
antecedent variable, though, is still clear, and the analysis 
procedure can compute a meaningful belief for the coun­
terfactual consequent. 
would choose to believe that the Traitor would have 
lived. Otherwise, we would conclude that the Traitor 
would still have expired. 
3 LINEAR-NORMAL MODELS 
The remainder of the paper will concentrate on mod­
els where the functions of Eq. (1) are linear and the 
disturbances are normally distributed. Some notation 
will be helpful for expressing background knowledge 
and counterfactual queries in this class of models. Up­
per case letters (e.g., Q) represent variables and the 
corresponding lower case letters (e.g., q) represent the 
value of those variables. When referring to a set of 
variables or values, we will use vector notation (e.g., X 
and i); however, the arrow will be dropped whenever 
the variable is used as a subscript and its context is 
known. The distribution of variables in a linear struc­
tural equation model with Gaussian disturbances is 
fully specified by a mean vector (i1x) and a covariance 
matrix (:Ex ,x). 
Counterfactual dis�ributions will be notated by /-lc•ja* ,o 
and Ec•,c•iii•,o whtch may be read as the "mean and 
covariance of c given the observations o, if a were true 
( counterfactually) ." 
Assume that knowledge is specified by the linear 
structural equation model (often used in economet­
rics and the social sciences, and originally established 
by Sewall Wright in his development of path analysis 
[Wright, 1921]) 
i Bi+f 
where B is a matrix (not necessarily triangular) corre­
sponding to a causal model (possibly cyclic), and we 
are given the mean ji, and covariance :E, , of the dis­
turbances f (assumed to be normal). The' variables on 
the right-hand side of a structural equation are inter­
preted as the causal influences of the variable on the 
left-hand side of the equation. The mean and covari­
ance of the observable variables X are then given by 
Px Sji, (15) 
Ex,x = S:E,,,st (16) 
where S = (I- B)-1. 
Under such a model, there are well-known formulas 
[Whittaker, 1990, p. 163] for evaluating the mean and 
covariance of X conditioned on some observations o: 
(17) 
(18) 
where, for every pair of subvectors, Z and W, of X, 
Ez,w is the submatrix of Ex,x with entries correspond-
ing to the components of Z and W. Singularities of :E 
terms are handled by appropriate means. 
Similar formulas apply for the mean and covariance of 
X under an action a. For mathematical convenience, 
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let X be partitioned according to whether each vari­
able is referred to in a. The set of variables referred 
to in a is denoted by i, and the set of remaining vari­
ables in X is denoted by Y. Under this partition, the 
matrix B can be partitioned into four submatrices: 
B 
B is replaced by the action-pruned matrix B = [b;j], 
defined by 
b;j 
{
 
�ij 
if X; E a 
otherwise 
Equivalently, 
B 
[ 
B
J
y B
o
z
] 
According to intervention semantics [Pearl, 1994], all 
links from f'z to Z are severed and Z is forced to the 
value a. Therefore, the modified structural equation 
model for X when influenced by external actions is 
given by 
x (I-iJ)-1 
[ 
�] +(I-iJ)-1 
[ 
�
] 
Given the mean and covariance of f'y, the mean and 
covariance of the observable variables X may be eval­
uated: 
flxla 
[ ��:: 
] 
[ 
(I- Byy)-lf:'Y + Byziiz) 
] 
(19) 
To evaluate the counterfactual distribution J.lx•ia•o and 
Ex•,x•ja, we first update the prior distribution of the 
disturbances by their distribution conditioned on the 
observations o: 
fl, + E, oE;,�(o-flo) 
fl, + E, , S�( SoE, ,S�)-1(o- flo) 
E, f-E, oE0-01Eo' I I I I 
E, ,-E, , S!( S0E, , S!)-1 S0E, , 
where So is the submatrix of S containing all columns 
of S but only those rows corresponding to the observed 
variables in o. 
We then evaluate the means flx•ia•o and variances 
Ex•,x•ja•o of the variables in the counterfactual world 
(X*) under the action a using Eqs. (19) and (20), by 
replacing the prior distribution on the disturbances 
E, , and J.l, with the posterior distribution E0, , y, y y y, y 
and J.l�: y 
[ 
(I-B )-1E0 ((I- B )-l)t YY fy,fy YY 
0 � ] (22) 
It is clear that this procedure can be applied to non­
triangular matrices, as long as Sis nonsingular. 
4 EXAMPLE 
Consider the econometric structural equation model 
described in [Goldberger, 1992]: 
q 
p 
b1p+d1i+u1 
b2q + d2w + u2 
(23) 
(24) 
where q is the quantity of household demand for prod­
uct A, p is the unit price of product A, i is household 
income, w is wage rate for producing product A, u1 is demand shock, and u2 is supply shock. 
We extend this model by incorporating an additional 
variable r, the household demand for some substitute 
product B, along with its structural equation 
r = b3p+ u3 
Let B stand for tea and A for coffee. Consider the 
following set of counterfactual queries: 
1. Find the expected demand for coffee ( q) had coffee 
prices (p) been controlled, say at p = $7.00? 
2. Find the expected demand for coffee (q) had coffee 
prices (p) been controlled, say at p = $7.00, as­
suming the demand for tea subsequently reaches 
r = 4? 
3. Given that the current demand for tea ( r) is r = 4, 
find the expected demand for coffee ( q) had coffee 
prices (p) been controlled, say at p = 7 .00? 
Note the difference between queries 2 and 3. Query 
2 states that the price intervention occurs prior to 
our observation of product B's demand, while query 
3 states that we first make an observation of product 
B's demand and then intervene to force product A's 
price. 
The above counterfactual queries only involve the vari­
ables X = [ P, Q, R]; therefore, we may marginalize out 
all remaining variables in Eqs. (23) and (24), only re­
taining the distributions on P,  Q, and R's disturbance 
terms. Because I and W are exogenous (root) vari­
ables in the structural equations, we may combine I 
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and U1 into one disturbance variable fq. Likewise, W 
and U2 may be combined into one disturbance variable 
fp. The structural equations for analyzing the above 
counterfactual queries may be reduced to 
i Bi+f' [ 
�1 
b3 
b2 0 l [ p l [ fp l 0 0 q + fq 0 0 r fr (25) 
The causal structure for this model is shown in Fig­
ure 3. 
Product A 
Price 
Product A 
Demand 
Product B 
Demand 
Figure 3: Causal structure of an econometric model 
relating the demand for two products A and B and the 
price of product A. The variables are related according 
to the linear structural equations given in Eq. {25 ), 
where the disturbances fp, fq, and fr are independent 
and normally distributed. 
Because R and Q are d-separated ([Pearl, 1988]) by 
P when the arrow Q ---+ P is removed, the observa­
tion of R after P's intervention has no impact on the 
evaluation of Q's distribution. Therefore, the counter­
factual distribution of demand for coffee (Q) will be 
the same for queries 1 and 2. 
Suppose that the parameters for this model are given 
by [ 0 0.50 0 l B -1.80 0 0 1.00 0 0 
P! [ o 19.oo 3.oo ] [ 1.00 0 0 l E,,, 0 3.00 0 0 0 2.00 
which reflects the following prior distribution on X = 
[P, Q, R]: 
j1; [ 5.00 10.00 8.00 ] [ 0.48 -0.08 0.48 ] 
Ex,x -0.08 1.73 -0.08 
0.48 -0.08 2.48 
The expected price of coffee is $5.00, while the average 
demand for coffee and tea are 10 units and 8 units, 
respectively. 
Query 1 is interested in determining the distribution 
of demand for coffee (Q), given that no observations 
have been made on the system, if we had intervened 
to force the price of coffee to $7.00. Evaluating the 
expressions in Eqs. (21) and (22), we obtain: 
j1�*1ft=7 [ 7.00 6.40 10.00 ] (26) 
Ux•lft=7 = 
[ 
� 3.0� � ] 
0 0 2.00 
We conclude that the average household demand for 
coffee and tea would be 6.4 units and 10 units, respec­
tively, if the price of coffee were $7.00. 
Query 3 asks for the expected demand demand for 
coffee ( Q) had the price of coffee been controlled at 
$7.00, given that demand for tea is currently 4 units. 
Applying the expressions in Eqs. (21) and (22): 
jt�*lft=7,r=4 [ 7.00 5.13 6.78 ] (27) 
Ux•lft=7,r=4 = 
[ 
� 2.7� -0.6� ] 
0 -0.64 0.39 
Note the importance of the observation of demand for 
tea ( R). In query 1, we found that forcing the price of 
coffee (P) to $7.00 would reduce the expected demand 
for coffee (Q) from 10 units to 6.4 units. The observa­
tion of a 4 unit demand for tea changes the expected 
demand for coffee to J.lqir=4 = 10.13 units; if we inter­
vene to force the price of coffee to $7.00, the expected 
demand for coffee (Q) will be reduced from 10.13 to 
5.13 units. Therefore, we see that enforcing a $7.00 
price control on coffee would have a more adverse af­
fect on the demand for coffee under the knowledge that 
the demand for tea was only 4 units. In addition, the 
expected demand for tea would increase to 6.78 units 
from the observed 4 units. 
If we believe that the disturbance on the demand for 
coffee ( fq) changes slowly, or at least changes infre­
quently, then we can use the results of this counterfac­
tual distribution to determine whether price controls 
should now be imposed to meet our needs. In other 
words, the counterfactual distribution will tell us how 
we expect variables' distributions to change as a result 
of an external intervention applied in the present. 
It is important to note the difference between counter­
factual distributions (conditioned on observations and 
external intervention) and distributions simply condi­
tioned on observations. Consider the distribution that 
would be computed from observing the price of coffee 
at $7.00 (p = 7) or from observing the demand for tea 
at 4 units and the coffee price at $7.00 (r = 4, p = 7): 
jt�lp=7 [ 7.00 9.66 10.00 ] (28) [ � 0 2.0� l Ux,xlp=1 1.71 (29) 0 
-t 
J.lxlr=4,p=7 = [ 7.00 9.66 4.00 ] (30) [ � 0 � l (1 x ,xlr=4,p=1 1.71 (31) 0 
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Contrast the expected demand for coffee evaluated 
from these conditional distributions with that ex­
pected had the price of coffee been fixed by exter­
nal intervention. In particular, compare Eq. (28) to 
Eq. (26) and Eq. (30) to Eq. (27) . One reason it is 
incorrect to use distributions conditioned on observa­
tions for evaluating (economic) policies, is that such 
distributions convey false information about the post­
intervention state of the disturbances. Accounting for 
the pre-intervention value of the controlled variables, 
which convey correct information about those distur­
bances, is important therefore for properly evaluating 
the effect of the intervention. 
5 CONCLUSION 
This paper has addressed the inadequacy of current 
techniques in econometrics and the social sciences for 
evaluating the potential effects of economic and social 
policies. Current techniques fail to correctly evalu­
ate policies that control endogenous variables, that is, 
variables that are influenced by other variables in the 
system prior to enacting the policy. 
We have addressed this deficiency by developing and 
applying a formalism for evaluating counterfactual 
conditionals in structural equation models. This 
method is applicable to the analysis of policies, even 
when the policy dictates intervention on an endoge­
nous variable. An example was presented that demon­
strates the disparity between analyses based on coun­
terfactuals and reduced-form analysis which treats in­
tervention as an observation on controlled variables. 
The technique developed in this paper should also be 
applicable to AI problems in situations where a strat­
egy is to be evaluated on the basis of structural equa­
tions with a given functional form. Examples are pre­
sented for causal models using boolean functions, with 
and without exceptions . 
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